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Abstract
This paper uses a structural PVAR model to study the macroeconomic effects of trade
disintegration among NAFTA members. The results reveal substantial asymmetric
responses, showing that the US is the most affected economy from a sudden negative
trade integration shock. Moreover, Canada and the US are found to be relatively more
interconnected with each other compared to the Mexican economy. Our findings
question the US decision to push for the renegotiation of the NAFTA agreement.
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1 Introduction
Regionalism has entered a new phase, with mega-regional trade negotiations suddenly
collapsing and unexpected withdrawals from long-standing integration schemes. Deep
divisions and turmoil over trade issues have been epitomised in the uncertain future of
the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), where President Trump recently called
for a renegotiation of the deal. This environment has led to questions about the effects
of a ‘break-up’ shock. There are a number of notable examples, in the regionalism
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literature, on the collapse of large-scale and/or long-standing integration schemes: the
break-up of empires (Head et al. 2010), the soviet block (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 2003)
and more recently, Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017). Head et al. (2010) explore the trade
dynamics of former colonies with their coloniser, within a gravity framework. They
find that hostile seperations, conceptually not too far removed from to a break-up
shock, have a stronger immediate negative impact on trade compared to a mutually
accepted split. While methodologically similar, Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) examine
the trade effects of the collapse of the Soviet block and find evidence of a strong
decrease of home bias in trade relations; where Suesse (2018) utilise a game-theoretical
model and argue that even the expectation of the Soviet block collapse was sufficient to
create a strong negative effect on trade that impacted on output. However, Thom and
Walsh (2002) find no evidence of a negative impact of the break-up of the union,
measured by the introduction of an exchange rate between the UK and Ireland in 1979.
Finally, the recent evidence of Dhingra et al. (2017) on the welfare effects of Brexit,
using a computational general equilibrium model, shows that the UK welfare losses
from higher trade barriers will exceed fiscal savings. In summary, the literature
exploring disintegration is limited and has yielded mixed results. Therefore, much less
is known about the effect of negative integration shocks compared to trade integration
(Manchester and McKibbin 1995). Furthermore, the methodologoical approaches used
in the aforementioned studies are not intented to specifically explore the impact of an
unexpected shock. Hence, the novelty of this paper is that it focuses on the impact of a
surprise disintegration on the macro-fundamentals of NAFTA countries.
Methodologically, the analysis of unexpected shocks or surprises is typically under-
taken within a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) modelling framework. This type
of analysis is frequently applied, and the advantages are well understood, in the context
of business cycles and the monetary transmission mechanism (Fève et al. 2018). On the
other hand, research using SVAR modelling to consider the impact of shocks in a trade
setting is still in its infancy. For example, Çakir and Kabundi (2013) investigate an
export/import shock, Nordmeier et al. (2016) a trade liberalization shock, Du et al.
(2017) a political relations shock, and, most recently, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2018)
consider a terms of trade shock. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2018) focus on a group of
emerging and poor countries and find that terms of trade shocks have a more limited
impact on key macroeconomic indicators, than one would expect based on the findings
from models with micro-foundations. The focus for Nordmeier et al. (2016) is some-
what different, where they explore the impact of a trade liberalisation shock on the
German labour market; they find a positive effect broadly in line with the existing
literature. Du et al. (2017) find that political shocks die out quickly, and therefore high-
frequency data is required to identify the impact of such shocks on trade. The authors
also find that gravity models use low frequency data, and in doing so fail to identify the
impact of these shocks. Finally, Çakir and Kabundi’s (2013) global VAR (GVAR)
analysis allows the authors to identify trade linkages between South Africa and the
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries. Therefore, this paper contributes to
this emerging literature by exploring the impact of a trade disintegration shock.
Furthermore, in comparison to the current literature, we explore a trade disintegra-
tion shock within a structural panel VAR (PVAR) framework; thereby allowing us to
examine the effect of the shock on various macroeconomic indicators for the three
members of NAFTA (Canada, Mexico and the US). The main advantage of PVARs
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over traditional SVAR models is the addition of the cross-sectional structure. More
precisely, the PVARmodel can account for cross-sectional heterogeneities as well as for
static and dynamic interdependencies in a multi-country framework (Montiel and
Pedroni 2019). In the next section, we properly analyse these properties. In this way,
PVARs can capture greater variety of potential interlinkages than GVARs (Pesaran
et al. 2004), which impose a particular structure on the interdependencies. These are
significant properties that allows us to assess and test the potential linkages and
spillovers among the examined economies. In conducting this analysis, we provide a
timely contribution to the literature considering the potential impact of a sudden
collapse of trade between NAFTA members. Furthermore, we illustrate the usefulness
of PVAR modelling to explore the responses to a trade disintegration shock for the
NAFTA participants.
Our empirical results show a significant degree of heterogeneity in terms of macro-
economic responses of the three NAFTA members, and reveal that the US economy is
the most vulnerable to a negative trade integration shock. Furthermore, the US and
Canadian economies are found to be more interlinked with each other as opposed to
Mexico. These findings question the decision by the US administration for a renego-
tiation or full withdrawal from the NAFTA agreement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model
and the data. Section 3 discusses the empirical results and provides the robustness
checks. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Model and Data
2.1 Model
Our model is built upon a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) framework, where the
terminology that we use thereafter is based on Canova and Ciccarelli (2013). In general,
PVAR models are increasingly becoming a popular tool for examining the interactions
of several entities (see for example Apostolakis and Papadopoulos 2019; Montiel and
Pedroni 2019). The main advantage over traditional structural VARs is the addition of a
cross-sectional structure. This is a significant property that allows us to assess and test
the potential linkages and spillovers among the examined countries. Letting y i, t be a
vector of G endogenous variables of country i (i = 1,…,N) at time t (t = 1,…,T) with l
lags (l = 1,…,L) and x t a set ofM exogenous variables, common to all units, the PVAR
model is written as:
yi;t ¼ A1i1;ty1;t−1 þ…þ ALi1;ty1;t−L þ A1i2;ty2;t−1 þ…þ ALi2;ty2;t−L þ…þ A1iN ;tyN ;t−1
þ…þ ALiN ;tyN ;t−L þ Ci;txt þ ei;t; ð1Þ
where Alij;t are G*Gmatrices, Ci,t is a G*Mmatrix and ei,t are the uncorrelated over-time
errors distributed as N(0,Σii,t) with Σii,t the variance-covariance matrix. The model can
be re-written in analytical form as:
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where y i,t is the vector of endogenous variables, xt contains the exogenous variables
and ei, t are the error terms.
The unrestricted PVAR specification suffers from over-parameterization; this is
because even a small PVAR is characterised by high parameter-space dimension-
ality.1 Overcoming this problem requires the imposition of structural restrictions.
We focus on four groups of restrictions; (i) cross-sectional heterogeneities, (ii)
dynamic interdependencies, (iii) static interdependencies and (iv) dynamic hetero-
geneities. In the present context, it would be unrealistic to assume the homogeneity
of the examined economies. Therefore, we allow for cross-sectional heterogene-
ities, i.e., Alik;t≠A
l
jk;t and Σii, t ≠Σjj, t when i ≠ j. In addition, since we are interested in
capturing all the potential cross-sectional linkages among the examined economies,
we assume that our system is characterised by dynamic interdependencies. Thus,
the endogenous variables of each country depend on the lags of the endogenous
variables of every other country. Using the above notation, this is equivalent to Alij;t
≠0 when i ≠ j. Furthermore, given the close economic ties among NAFTA members,
we also allow for static interdependencies. Mathematically, Σij,t ≠ 0 when i ≠ j.
Therefore, we let a shock in one country be transmitted to another country. Finally,
given the relative short time-span, it seems reasonable to assume dynamic homo-
geneity (homoscedasticity). These are the type of restrictions that we impose in our
model, i.e., Alij;t ¼ Alij;s and Σij,t =Σij,s, when t ≠ s. The advantage of our PVAR
specification is that allows for dynamic interactions among economies. In this way,
our model differs from single VARs that are estimated using either data from one
country or panel data (pooled estimates). The details of our estimation strategy are
described in the online Appendix.
1 In the unrestricted version of our relatively small PVAR, with G = 4, N = 3, M = 1 and L = 1, 225 model
parameters and 120 error variances and covariances should be estimated.
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2.2 Data
We use annual data for the period 1950–2011 for the three members of the NAFTA trade
bloc (Canada, Mexico and the US).2 The endogenous variables used in the analysis
consist of: i) historical trade integration index (HTI), ii) real GDP (GDP), iii) consump-
tion (CON) and iv) investment (INV). As an exogenous variable we use the spot crude
oil price (OIL) as a proxy for supply side effects. The selection of macroeconomic
variables, which are all expressed as log-deviations from the trend, is based on the work
of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2018) and are collected from the IMF-IFS database, while
the oil price is from the FRED database. The HTI index is based on the work of
Standaert et al. (2016).3 The index is based on a state-space model that combines four
alternative indicators of the level of trade integration into one overall index. The main
advantage of this index is its bilateral nature, where HTI i→ j identifies country i as the
exporter to country j, where HTI i→ j ≠ HTI j→ i. In this way, we have six different sub-
indexes; HTI CAN→MEX, HTI MEX→CAN, HTI US→CAN, HTI CAN→US, HTI US→MEX and
HTI MEX→US. Each of these indexes proxies the level of trade integration between the
two countries (Standaert et al. 2016). For instance, HTI CAN→MEX refers to bilateral trade
integration between Canada andMexico from the Canadian perspective, i.e., an increase
in the HTI CAN→MEX indicates that Canadian-Mexican trade is becomingmore important
from the Canadian point of view. In this particular case, our results will show the
response of the Canadian macroeconomic variables to a shock in HTI CAN→MEX.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the bilateral HTI indexes for the NAFTA members
over the period 1950–2011. The figure shows evidence of considerable heterogeneity in
the trade integration across the NAFTA participants.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Main Results
We start the exposition of our results with reference to the GDP impulse responses
presented in Fig. 2. All shocks represent a 1% decrease in the HTI integration index
(which we name as a disintegration shock). The left panel on the first row of Fig. 2
plots the Canadian GDP response to a negative shock in HTI CAN→US. The right panel
on the first row presents the Canadian GDP response to a shock in HTI CAN→MEX. In a
similar vein, the second row shows the Mexican GDP response to a shock in HTI MEX→
CAN (left panel) and a shock in HTI MEX→US (right panel). Finally, the third row shows
the US response from shocks in HTI US→CAN and HTI US→MEX, respectively.
Findings from the left panel in Fig. 2 suggest that Canadian and US activity is
negatively affected, with the US experiencing the highest and the longest impact.
Interestingly, our evidence suggests that both economies respond negatively on impact.
This reflects the strong interconnection between the two economies. On the contrary, a
2 The year 2011 is the last available observation of the HTI index.
3 We follow the approach of Sims et al. (1990), Lin and Tsay (1996) and Choi (2017), according to which it is
still desirable to estimate a VAR model, even if the variables contain unit roots.
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Fig. 1 The bilateral trade integration index (HTI) for the three NAFTA members (1950–2011)
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shock in HTI CAN→MEX and HTI US→MEX does not impact economic activity in Canada
and the US in a statistically significant way. As far as Mexican economic activity is
concerned (second row of Fig. 2), our evidence reveals that Mexico is robust to a trade
disintegration shock; both GDP responses are statistically insignificant. One possible
explanation is that Mexican exports could still be traded with US/Canada outside the
NAFTA agreement, particularly those that support supply chains, or to alternative
markets without significant increases in economic costs.4
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the impulse responses of the remaining macroeconomic
variables (CON and INV) for the three NAFTA members. The left panel of Fig. 3 plots
the responses of Canadian consumption and investment to a negative shock in
HTI CAN→US. The effects in both variables are negative and statistically significant.
Fig. 2 Impulse responses of the Canadian, Mexican and US real GDP (GDP) to a negative shock to the
bilateral trade integration index (HTI)
4 Recent evidence suggests that the benefits to Mexico from the NAFTA deal are limited (Ramírez Sánchez
et al. 2018).
Trade (Dis)integration: The Sudden Death of NAFTA
Investment initially decreases by 0.02%, while consumption is reduced by slightly less.
Even though the reduction is not large, the variables return to their pre-shock levels
only after 4 years. The right panel of Fig. 3 shows the effect for the Canadian economy
of a negative shock to HTI CAN→MEX. Our evidence suggests that the Canadian
economy responds negatively on impact. However, the effects are both economically
and statistically insignificant. This asymmetric reaction of Canada reflects the primary
role of the US economy.
Looking into the Mexican economy, the reaction to HTI shocks presents quite an
interesting outcome. For the former case (the integration between Mexico and Canada),
the left panel of Fig. 4 shows that Mexican consumption and investment increase as
result of a negative shock. However, this increase is statistically insignificant as the
broad error bands depict. For the case of a HTI MEX→US shock (right panel of Fig. 4),
the reaction is roughly zero.
Turning to the US economy, our evidence reveals further asymmetries. A sudden
negative shock to HTI US→CAN has a significant economic cost for the US, as it is
depicted in the left panel of Fig. 5. A 1% decrease in HTI causes a roughly 0.5%
reduction in both consumption and investment. On the other hand, the US seems to be
unaffected by a negative shock in HTI US→MEX. The responses presented in the right
panel of Fig. 5 show negative albeit insignificant reactions.
In addition, we supplement our main empirical results with a battery of tests, using
alternative specifications, orderings and transformations of the variables in the struc-
tural PVAR model, to check the robustness of our findings. As a first exercise, we
estimate the implulse responses based on the PVAR model without the inclusion of the
Fig. 3 Impulse responses of the Canadian consumption (CON) and investment (INV) to a negative shock to
the bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between Canada-US and Canada-Mexico
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exogenous variable (OIL) in our specification. Our results and main conclusions remain
almost identical. Additionally, we employ the PVAR model using alternative orderings
Fig. 4 Impulse responses of the Mexican consumption (CON) and investment (INV) to a negative shock to
the bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between Mexico-Canada and Mexico-US
Fig. 5 Impulse responses of the US consumption (CON) and investment (INV) to a negative shock to the
bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between US-Canada and US-Mexico
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of the endogenous variables and we find that the results remain robust. Lastly, we
replicate the PVAR analysis using the logs of the endogenous variables (without using
the series transformed in log-deviations from the trend) and our main results remain
unaltered.5
Overall, our PVAR model reveals strong evidence of asymmetries among the three
NAFTA members. The economy more susceptible to trade disintegration is found to be
the US and, then, Canada. On the contrary, Mexico proves to be quite robust to a
sudden trade shock. Moreover, the US and Canadian economies are found to be
relatively more interconnected with each other rather than with the Mexican
economy. Our results reaffirm the recent evidence of Weisbrot et al. (2014) and
Ramírez Sánchez et al. (2018), while we call into question the earlier findings on the
effects of NAFTA by Krueger (1999) and Burfisher et al. (2001).
3.2 Robustness
To examine further the robustness of our main results, we consider a second PVAR
model where we use an alternative measure of trade integration and we implement
higher frequency (quarterly) data. In this PVAR model we follow the same structure
with our main PVAR but we replace the HTI i→ j index with an alternative measure;
that is, export share: XS i→ j. More precisely, we replace the HTI MEX→US with
XS MEX→US. In this particular example, XS MEX→US = ((X MEX→US / X MEX→WORLD) ×
100), where X i→ j represents the exports of country i to j. Given the quarterly
frequency of the new dataset, we split the sample into two subperiods; 1969Q1-
1993Q4 and 1994Q1-2018Q4 covering the pre-NAFTA and post-NAFTA periods,
respectively. The data for the export shares are collected from the WITS database of
the World Bank, while the rest of the variables are from the IMF-IFS database. To
facilitate the readibility of the results, we present the impulse responses of GDP to a 1%
negative shock in the XS i→ j measure. The remaining impulse responses (CON and
INV) are presented in the online Appendix.
Figure 6 presents the GDP impulse responses for the three economies for the pre-
NAFTA period, while Fig. 7 shows the corresponding results for the post-NAFTA
period. Following the same structure of Fig. 2, the first row shows the Canadian
responses, the second row presents the Mexican ones, while the last row shows the
US responses. All GDP impulse responses for the pre-NAFTA period are statistically
insignificant. The only exception is the US response to a XS US→CAN shock. On the
contrary, the results are different when we examine the post-NAFTA period. While
Mexican GDP responses are found insignificant, both the Canadian and the US GDP
are reduced after a negative shock in XS CAN→US and XS US→CAN, respectively.
Interestingly, the US GDP reduction remains larger than the Canadian one.
Once more, the evidence suggests the asymmetry across the three economies
highlighting the stronger interconnections between Canada and US. The pattern of
responses for consumption and investment for the post-NAFTA period is quantitatively
and qualitatively the same with the main results (available in the online Appendix).
5 These results can be provided upon request.
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4 Conclusions
The present paper is the first study that explores trade disintegration shocks within a
structural PVAR framework. The current interest in the NAFTA integration scheme,
and its potential disintegration in particular, provides an ideal setting to illustrate the
usefulness of this methodology. The PVAR framework allows us to assess and test the
potential linkages and spillovers among the NAFTA economies when faced with an
unexpected shock. Moreover, the recent trend of sudden trade disintegration shocks,
provides a number of other settings where this methodology could be applied in future.
By taking into account cross-country heterogeneity, we are able to identify asym-
metric macroeconomic responses to trade disintegration among the three NAFTA
participants. The US is found to have the highest losses, while Mexico the least.
Canada has already started to diversify its export markets by signing new trade deals
Fig. 6 Impulse responses of the Canadian, Mexican and US real GDP (GDP) to a negative shock to the export
share measure (XS) for the pre-NAFTA period
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(for example, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
with the European Union and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the
Pacific Rim countries), which are likely to further mitigate the negative
effects of a potential collapse of NAFTA. In terms of Mexico, they would
experience non-tariff barrier reductions (for example, by avoiding the
NAFTA Rules of Origin) by trading under World Trade Organisation rules,
which would go some way to mitigate the associated tariff increases. On the
other hand, US consumers would experience higher prices due to increases
in trade costs, where there is also the potential for additional US welfare
loss due to any retaliation from Mexico and Canada. Overall, our findings
suggest that a sudden unexpected negative shock on the integration of the
NAFTA block damages the US.
Fig. 7 Impulse responses of the Canadian, Mexican and US real GDP (GDP) to a negative shock to the export
share measure (XS) for the post-NAFTA period
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